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Extended Abstract 
 
When we talk about financial innovation is important distinguishing between tools 
(inventions), a combination of tools, processes, services (innovations) and the business 
decisions how to use them (levels of innovation) (Kane, 1981). The financial invention of the 
securitization process and the ensuing financial innovations (pooling, the creation of complex 
derivatives, a wide range of complex financial services, etc.) had a positive impact on the 
technological development of the financial system and in turn on the entire economic system. 
If invention and innovation are assumed positive for the economic system, why things turn 
bad during the 2007-2009 financial crisis? First of all, we need to differentiate between the 
concept of good and bad financial innovation (Zingales, 2015), which is tightly linked to the 
business decisions that the financial agents take. Therefore, in finance, good financial 
innovation improves risk management and reduces transaction costs. In contrast, bad 
financial innovation facilitates regulatory arbitrage, market segmentation and rent seeking 
speculators. Also, monopolistic positions are put in place in order to increase market/political 
power, self-gain and maximize economic rent. Through a kind of accelerator effect, positive 
economic rent opportunities created by bad financial innovation, and ongoing segmentation, 
increase information asymmetries. This, in turn, raises the possibility of default and the 
likelihood that a financial crisis will become an economic crisis. In addition, when private 
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interest “captures” the public interest, it is highly likely that speculative finance will build up, 
as predicted by Minsky (1982).  
 
There seems to exist a sort of endogenous mechanism regarding the level of financial 
innovation (business decisions) that is playing a central role in fostering or slowing down 
economic growth. The investigation of this endogenous mechanism is of crucial importance 
for understanding how policy-makers should intervene. We come from a period of sluggish 
regulation of the financial system, and gradually we moved now in an era with policymakers 
are panicking to find solutions over-regulating the financial system
4
. The imbalance between 
demand and supply of financial assets will grow worse rather than be reduced, given the 
excess of intervention (what Caballero and Farhi, 2014 define the ‘Safety Trap’ and Kane, 
1977 identifies as ‘Regulatory Dialectic’). Rather, policies should be designed to keep pace 
with increasing environmental and structural changes, stabilizing the ‘regulatory adaptation 
gap’ between decision-makers and financial operators over time (see the discussion 
concerning the ‘Regulatory Dialectic’ by Kane 1977, 1983). We suspect that one of the 
underlying explanations, why the policy interventions set to resolve the 2007-2009 crisis 
have been ineffective, is the downplayed and misunderstood endogenous role of the level of 
financial innovation. It can dramatically amplify the money/credit creation within the 
economic system without to wait for deposits (Ryan-Collins et al., 2011) but, on the contrary 
generating deposits ex nihilo (Schumpeter, 1934). Therefore, the question is how to capture 
this amplifying mechanism.  In the paper, we will refer to the level of financial innovation as 
the rate of financial innovation (RoFIN). RoFIN within the economic system can create 
positive or negative externalities producing amplified positive or negative financial effects 
that can impact on the business cycle. However, in literature, the role of RoFIN within the 
banking system has not been investigated, yet. The theoretical and empirical studies show 
more attention to the concept of financial innovation, its impact on the financial depth and its 
resulting effects on the economic growth (i.e. see Tufano and Lerner, 2011; Klein and Olivei, 
2008; Levine, 1997, 2005; Rousseau, 1998). Conceptually, financial innovation and RoFIN 
are intimately linked. However, the concept of financial innovation on its own is not 
sufficient to explain financial crises, such as the 2007-2009 one, and the ensuing economic 
recessions. Most probably because, as we suspect, there exist a double-endogeneity. In fact, 
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we believe that the RoFIN is an endogenous phenomenon which plays a central role in the 
amplification of the endogenous money/credit creation mechanism. Is it possible to capture 
the RoFIN mechanism and its amplifying effects? If yes, how? And, how to design the 
linkage between the endogenous bank money/credit creation and the RoFIN in a 
macroeconomic model? Is it possible to observe how this double-endogeneity is impacting on 
the economic growth? The paper will answer these questions using for our investigation an 
ABM approach. In particular, we implemented within the EURACE model the above-
outlined mechanism of double-endogeneity. We set the commercial banks securitization 
propensity, given the level of asset risk held on their balance sheet and a financial system that 
allows the risk shifting from an agent to another. The securitization propensity of the banks 
modifies indirectly the debt-to-income ratio (DSTI in EURACE model), which reflects the 
households’ creditworthiness conditions required by the banking system to grant a mortgage. 
Increasing level of an endogenous DSTI mirrors (and captures) the level of financial 
innovation in the system (RoFIN). The paper shows as a change in the endogenous variable 
RoFIN (which is captured in the model by a change in the debt-to-service-income ratio given 
a change in the securitiazion propensity of the financial operators) amplifies the endogenous 
credit creation and generates endogenous financial crisis (double-endogeneity). At higher rate 
of innovation the model presents loosened lending criteria. This impacts negatively on the 
Capital Adequacy Ratio, increases the risk exposure of the financial operators (banks) over 
time, leads to crisis and ends up in economic slowdowns and/or recessions. The outcomes of 
the simulations provide clear evidence that what matters, especially in term of policy 
analysis, is the RoFIN and not just the financial innovation per se. 
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